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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ENDING THE EXPANSION OF THE
FLORIDA PRIVACY AMENDMENT
Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997)
Shannon Brewer"
Respondent, a terminally ill patient with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, wanted to establish his right to obtain physician-assisted
death when his expectation of a normal quality of life had ended.! A
second respondent, the patient's physician,2 feared prosecution if he
aided the patient,3 and joined the patient4 in filing suit for a declaratory
judgment that Florida's assisted suicide statute' violated the Florida
privacy amendment. 6 Respondents also asserted that the statute violated
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7 The trial court granted
* To Jacqueline and Perry Brewer, my parents, for a lifetime of unconditional support,
enthusiasm, and approval.
1. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 99-100 (Fla. 1997). The respondent had been
hospitalized with hepatitis, herpes, Epstein-Barr virus, pneumonia, blindness, and other illnesses.
Id. He was taking numerous medications, including morphine, to treat his pain. Id.
2. Id. at 99. Respondent patient was not ready to die, but wanted counseling from a
physician to make that choice when he felt it was necessary. McIver v. Krischer, 4 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 538, 539 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997). Respondent wanted to avoid making a
mistake and worsening his condition. l
3. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 99. Though Florida does not criminalize suicide, the
assisted suicide statute does impose criminal liability on those who aid others in suicide. Id. at
100 (citing FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1995)). The court stated that 45 states recognize the right to
refuse medical treatment and also disapprove of assisted suicide. Id.
4. Two additional plaintiffs, Chuck Castonguay and Robert G. Cron, died prior to trial.
Mclver, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 538. Their claims were dismissed as moot by the trial court.
Id.
5. FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1995) (providing that "Every person deliberately assisting
another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter .... "). Florida has
no corresponding statute criminalizing suicide. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 100.
6. Mclver, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 538. Article 1, Section 23, of the Florida
Constitution, the Florida privacy amendment, provides: "Every natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public
records and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
7. Mclver, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 538. The Krischercourt stated that those issues had
already been decided by two recent United States Supreme Court cases. Krischer,697 So. 2d
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the respondents' declaratory judgment, holding that, under the circumstances of the case, the Florida privacy amendment imparted on the
respondent patient a constitutional right to end his life and to seek a
physician's aid in doing so.' On appeal, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion, but certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida the question of whether a competent, terminally-ill
adult has a constitutional right to end his life with the assistance of a
physician. 9 The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction," and
reversing the decision of the trial court, HELD, that the privacy
amendment of the Florida Constitution cannot be construed so broadly
as to include a right to physician-assisted suicide."
In 1980, Florida voters granted special protection to the right of
privacy by adopting the Florida privacy amendment.' 2 The extent of the
right was not fully examined, however, until the Supreme Court of
Florida decided Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering in
1985.'" In Winfield, Florida state agencies issued subpoenas for
petitioners' financial records without notifying the petitioners and
instructed the financial institutions not to inform the petitioners of the
subpoenas. 4 In this case of first impression,"5 the court established a
compelling state interest standard of review for deciding controversies6
that included alleged violations of the Florida privacy amendment.'

at 100 (citing Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997)).
8. Mclver, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 543. The decision was qualified with certain
conditions. Id. Respondent physician would be allowed to prescribe a deadly drug and provide
counseling in its use, but the prescription must be self-administered by respondent patient. Ma
Respondents must both agree that patient was "(1) competent, (2) imminently dying, and (3)
prepared to die." Id.
9. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 99.
10. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction directly from the trial court
because the matter was certified as one of great public importance. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 3(b)(5).
11. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 102.
12. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989); see also Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.
2d 359, 360-61 (Fla. 1980) (recognizing a need for legislative attention to the issue of privacy,
urging the legislature to act, but responding to public need by deciding to address privacy issues
on a case-by-case basis absent a decision by the legislature).
13. 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
14. Id. at 546.
15. See id. at 547.
16. Id. The court determined that where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the
State, to justify intruding into that right, must show that a compelling state interest is being
served through the least intrusive means. Id. The court established this standard in spite of prior
reluctance to do so. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla.
1983) (applying the compelling state interest standard of review to that case, but declining to
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Under the facts of Winfield, the court found that the State intruded on
petitioners' privacy rights only to protect compelling state interests, and
that the State did so by utilizing the least intrusive means possible. 7
Although the United States Supreme Court had previously denied that
a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in financial records," the
Supreme Court of Florida held that, under the Florida privacy amendment, an expectation of privacy in financial records was reasonable."
The decision in Winfield expanded the Florida privacy amendment to
provide more protection for Florida citizens under the Florida Constitution than under the United States Constitution.
Though the Supreme Court of Florida generally has been willing to
find governmental interests sufficiently compelling to override the right
of privacy in disclosure cases," it has been less willing to allow
government intrusion in privacy cases that involve personal
decisionmaking.22 The court emphasized the distinction between
disclosure and personal decisionmaking issues in In re TW. 3 In TW.,
a pregnant minor challenged the Florida statute requiring minors to
obtain parental consent before undergoing an abortion.24 The court held
that the statute violated the minor's right to privacyY
impose that standard on future privacy cases). Interestingly, this is the same standard of review
that the United States Supreme Court uses when reviewing challenges to law that allege
violations of fundamental rights. See Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
17. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
18. Id. at 547 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
19. Id. at 548.
20. Id. The court noted that the drafters of the Florida privacy amendment purposefully
omitted the words "unreasonable" and "unwarranted" in conjunction with "governmental
intrusion" to make the privacy right as strong as possible. Id.
21. TW., 551 So. 2d at 1192. The court also has noted several factual scenarios that
implicated the privacy right. Id. (citing Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 So. 2d 113
(Fla. 1988) (holding that the privacy interests of parties in marriage dissolution did not warrant
order sealing court records); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987)
(holding that the privacy interests of blood donors were sufficient to prevent discovery of their
names in a wrongful death action where plaintiff sought to establish blood transfusion as source
of AIDS infection); Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547 (allowing state subpoena of financial records);
FloridaBd, of Bar Examiners, 443 So. 2d at 71 (allowing bar application questions regarding
psychiatric records)).
22. Id.; see In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 828 (Fla. 1993) (holding that hospital must
comply with patient's wishes to refuse blood transfusion); State v. Herbert (In re Guardianship
of Browning), 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 1990) (allowing guardian of incompetent person to exercise
the right to refuse life support systems); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla.
1989) (holding that a patient has a privacy right in refusing a blood transfusion).
23. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
24. See id. at 1189.
25. Id. at 1196.
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The TW.court explained the rationale for granting more protection
to privacy in personal decisionmaking cases than in disclosure cases.26
The court stated that personal and private decisions about the body are
"basic to individual dignity and autonomy" and, as such, should be
protected by the Florida privacy amendment.27 The court reasoned that
these decisions are best made by the individual because the decisions
involve physical, psychological, and economic factors that are unique to
the individual.28 Consequently, interests asserted by the state are
29
seldom sufficiently compelling to overcome the privacy interest.
Thus, in T.W., the court extended the privacy of bodily autonomy, and
articulated Floridians' right to make private decisions about matters
regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy and "when and how...
one's body is to terminate its organic life."3
The Supreme Court of Florida further expanded the privacy right to
include bodily autonomy for incompetent persons in State v. Herbert(In
re Guardianship of Browning).31 The patient in Browning was in a
vegetative state and had an incurable, but not terminal, condition.32 The
patient previously had expressed her wish to refuse any life-prolonging
procedures.33 When the patient became incompetent, her guardian
attempted to have life-support systems discontinued, including
nasogastric feeding.34 The court held that the guardian of an incompetent patient
may exercise the patient's right to refuse medical treat35
ment.
In reaching its decision, the Browning court weighed the interests of
the State against the privacy interest of the patient.36 The court evaluat26. See id. at 1192-93.
27. See id at 1193 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1192-93 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 133738 (2d ed. 1988)).
31. 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990).
32. Id. at 9. The patient, Ms. Estelle Browning, had suffered a stroke that resulted in
permanent brain damage. She was bedridden and required total care in a nursing home. Id.at
8.
33. Id. at 8-9. The patient had executed two living wills prior to suffering a stroke in 1986
and had orally expressed a desire to refuse any life-prolonging procedures. Id
34. Id.at 8.
35. Id. at 17. The court previously had determined that a competent person had a privacy
right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 11 (citing Wons, 541 So. 2d at 96 (holding that a
Jehovah's Witness could refuse an emergency blood transfusion even though death would likely
result)); see also Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d at 360-61 (allowing the removal of a respirator even
before the privacy amendment was added to the Florida Constitution).
36. See Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9-12, 13-14.
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ed the asserted state interest in preserving life, and drew a distinction
between cases where the patient can be cured and where the illness is
incurable.37 The distinction led the court to find that the State's interest
in the preservation of life is not compelling when the pafient's life can
be prolonged, but cannot be saved.38 The court also addressed the
State's interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession,
but found that this interest was insufficient to justify intrusion upon
fundamental privacy rights.39 The court reasoned that the patient had
expressed her wishes while still competent' and that a right to selfdetermination depends on the competent patient's wishes, not what
others determine may be in the patient's best interests.
The Supreme Court of Florida thereby continued the steady
expansion of the protection provided by the Florida privacy amendment.42 The amendment evolved to grant considerable protection to
individuals' rights in making personal and private decisions about the
body.43 Indeed, the court rarely has found the State's asserted interests
compelling enough to justify intrusion into an individual's privacy in
cases of personal decisionmaking.Y
In spite of that jurisprudential trend, the instant court declined to
further expand the protection of the Florida privacy amendment. 45 The
Krischer court acknowledged that the respondent's personal decision did
implicate the right of privacy, and the court announced the compelling
state interest standard of review for the case.46 The decision of the
court, however, that the privacy amendment could not be construed so
broadly as to include the right to assisted suicide, suggests that no
reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the instant case.47
The State's asserted interests in Krischer were preserving life,
preventing suicide, and maintaining the integrity of the medical

37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. (quoting Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (4th DCA 1978) (quoting
Superintendent of BeIchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417,425-26 (Mass. 1977)),
afftd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980)). The trial court had ruled that because the patient's death was

not imminent, the State's interests were compelling. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 14 (quoting Wons, 541 So. 2d at 101 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially)).

40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 10.
42. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., TW., 551 So. 2d at 1195-96.
45. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 104.
46. Id. at 102. The court articulated the first part of the strict scrutiny review but never
addressed the least intrusive means part of the test. See id at 102-04.
47. See id. at 104.
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profession. 4' The instant court found those interests compelling.49 The
court distinguished the instant case from previous personal
decisionmaking cases on the grounds that the respondent in the instant
case required an affimnative act to end his life while in previous cases
natural consequences were the ultimate cause of death.5' The court
found that the State's interest in preserving life became compelling
where the State's interference was necessary to prevent an affirmative
act against life.51 The court stated that it also found preventing suicide
and maintaining professional ethics in the medical community compelling state interests. 2
In contrast to the majority, the dissent in the instant case found that
the interests of the State were not compelling. 53 The dissent criticized
the majority for its distinction between active and passive means of
death.' According to the dissent, the majority's focus had been
mistakenly placed on the means by which death occurs while the inquiry
should have been directed at the patient who had reached the deathbed.55 The dissenting opinion stated that a means-based test could only

48. Id. at 103. The court evaluated the four recognized legitimate interests of the State:
protection of life, prevention of suicide, protection of medical ethics, and protection of innocent
third parties. Id. at 102-04. The fourth, protection of innocent third parties, was not implicated
in the instant case. Id. at 103 n.4.
49. Id. at 103. In previous personal decisionmaking cases, the court held that these same
interests did not justify intrusion on patients' rights of self-determination to refuse medical
treatment. Id. at 102.
50. Id. at 102-03. The court relied on a statement by the American Medical Society to
explain the distinction between refusing medical treatment and assisted suicide:
When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies primarily because of
an underlying disease. The illness is simply allowed to take its natural course. With
assisted suicide, however, death is hastened by the taking of a lethal drug or other
agent.... The inability of physicians to prevent death does not imply that
physicians are free to help cause death.

Id. (quoting AMA COUNCIL ON

ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT 1-93-8, at 2 (1993)).
51. Id. at 103.
52. Id. The court explained that the interest in preventing suicide is compelling because
legalizing assisted-suicide increases the State's difficulty in protecting persons who are
depressed, mentally ill, or suffering from untreated pain. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997)).
53. Id. at 115 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 110-11 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Kogan illustrated his objection
with a hypothetical patient who is conscious and voluntarily requests sedation to relieve chronic,
irreversible pain. The line between active and passive death is blurred when this patient has
requested no artificial feeding tubes. The patient is being sedated and allowed to starve to death.
Id. (Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 111 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
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work effectively when the patient will live if the action or inaction does
not occur.56
The Supreme Court of Florida expressed reluctance to weigh the
moral arguments on the issue of physician-assisted suicide." Additionally, the court refrained from infringing on the powers reserved to the
legislature.58 The court left room for legislative action on assisted
suicide, stating that "a carefully crafted statute" would not necessarily
be held unconstitutional.59
Refusing to expand protection for the right of privacy, the Krischer
court departed from the direction the Supreme Court of Florida
previously had been taking." The instant court suggested the absence
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in this case of personal
decisionmaking-a situation where a privacy right has almost always
attached before.6 ' The instant court held that it would not construe the
privacy amendment to include a right to assisted suicide, and sought to
narrow the interpretation of the privacy amendment's reach. 62
The former breadth of the interpretation is most noticeable in TW.
and Browning. The court stated in TW. that the State's interests had
never been found sufficiently compelling to justify intruding on personal
decisionmaking privacy rights.63 In the instant case, however, the court
distinguished prior bodily autonomy decisions, noting that the distinction
between active and passive means of death changed the evaluation of
the State's interests."
The instant court suggested that in cases where the means of death
is passive and the patient is allowed to die of natural causes, the State's

56. Id. (Kogan, C.., dissenting).
57. Id. at 104. The court discussed the concerns expressed by the New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law: risks to those already compromised by poverty, historically
disadvantaged social groups, old age, or depression. Il at 101.
58. Id. at 104. The dissent also disagreed on this point. Id. at 111 (Kogan, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent stated that the role of the court is to guarantee and protect individual
rights against the majority rule. Id. (Kogan, C.J., dissenting); see also Perlmutter,379 So. 2d
at 360 (stating that legislative inaction should not tie the hands of the judiciary, which should
proceed on a case-by-case basis until such time as the legislature speaks).

59. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 104.
60. See id. at 102; see also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.

61. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 104.
62. See id.
63. TW., 551 So. 2d at 1192; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
64. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102-03. The court drew the distinction between allowing
someone to die of natural causes and hastening their death with a "death producing agent." Id.
at 103. But see id. at 111 (Kogan, C.L, dissenting) (stating that the means test is inapplicable
to assisted suicide).
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interests are less than compelling.65 In the case of an active means of
death, however, the State's interest in preserving life becomes compelling.' This reasoning is inconsistent with the instant court's own
decision in Browning.' In Browning, the court distinguished between
curable and incurable illnesses and found that where an illness is
incurable, the State's interest in preservation of life is not compelling."
The instant court failed to address the issue of terminal or incurable
illnesses, relying instead on the means test. 69
Moreover, in Browning, the court allowed the guardian to discontinue
life-support systems to a woman who was incurably ill but was not
suffering from a terminal disease.70 In contrast, the respondent in the
instant case had a terminal disease.7 ' To maintain consistency with
Browning and TW., the court should have found that the distinction was
properly based on the situation of the patient, not the manner of
death.72 The court should not have altered the compelling interest
evaluation just to value a life that is already ending due to incurable
illness.73
Another compelling interest in the instant case that was not addressed
in conformity with the reasoning of previous cases was the interest in
maintaining the ethical standards of the medical profession.' 4 While the
instant court stated that such an interest was compelling, its only
explanation of the interest was a citation to an opinion of the American
Medical Association.75 The Browning court had dismissed this interest
as merely legitimate, stating that protecting the ethics of a profession
was less important than protecting the privacy rights of individuals.76
Not only did the instant court fail to adequately evaluate the State's
interests, it failed to address the second prong of the compelling state

65. Id. at 102.
66. See id. at 103.
67. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
68. See id.; see also supra note 32 (describing the incurable nature of Ms. Browning's
illness).
69. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102-03. But see id. at 111 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting)
(attacking the majority's means test as illogical).
70. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9, 17. The patient in Browning could have lived for an

undeterminable number of years if her life-support systems had not been discontinued. Id. at 9.
71. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 99.
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 115 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting) (stating that society has no
legitimate interest in saving a life which is already over).
74. Compare Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 with Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 103.
75. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 103-04.
76. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 (quoting Wons, 541 So. 2d at 101 (Ehrlich, C.J.,
concurring specially)).
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interest standard of review established by the Winfield court, the least
intrusive means test.' The court did not consider the possibility that a
complete prohibition against assisted suicide may exceed constitutional
constraints when regulation is a less intrusive means of protecting the
State's asserted interests. Unfortunately, however, the instant court
chose not to address the question of whether the prohibition achieved
the State's goals by the least intrusive means available.79
Apparently, the Krischer court did not want to decide the legality or
morality of assisted suicide." The court retreated from the trend it had
established in earlier privacy cases" and halted the expansion of the
protection provided by the Florida privacy amendment.8 2 While the
court applied a compelling state interest analysis initially, the compelling
interests that allowed the assisted suicide statute to stand had been
previously found less than compelling by the Supreme Court of
Florida. 3 Additionally, the court ignored the second half of the
compelling state interest analysis, the state's duty to curtail a privacy
right only by the least intrusive means.8" Finally, the court distanced
itself from making a possible decision about the virtue of assisted
suicide by deferring to the legislature.85
The privacy amendment may now provide less protection for the
citizens of Florida. The expansion of its protection has ceased, and it is
uncertain how far the scope of the privacy amendment will now reach.
It is unclear whether the court will go back to expanding the privacy
amendment, meaning that the Krischerdecision is merely an attempt to
avoid making a difficult moral determination, or if the protection of the
privacy amendment has been stretched to its limits.

77. See Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
78. See TW., 551 So. 2d at 1196. The court in TW. determined that a statute that leaves
no provision for any extraordinary circumstances is too restrictive to pass constitutional muster.
Id.
79. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102-04.
80. See id. at 104.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 19-30.
82. See Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 104.
83. Id. at 115 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 102-04.
85. Id. at 104.
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